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1. INTRODUCTION
In an endogenous growth model, Barro (1990) has examined the eﬀects
on economic growth of aggregate government spending including both ag-
gregate public consumption and aggregate public investment. The Barro
model does not consider the eﬀects of public expenditures by diﬀerent levels
of government. Subsequent work has extended Barro’s analysis by looking
into the composition of government expenditures and economic growth.
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For example, Easterly and Rebelo (1993); and Devarajan, Swaroop, and
Zou (1996) have studied the growth eﬀects of public spending on educa-
tion, transportation, defense, and social welfare. In addition, Davoodi and
Zou (1997); and Zhang and Zou (1997) have examined the growth eﬀects
of various public expenditures by diﬀerent levels of government. But in all
these studies, public capital formation is not explicitly considered.
Another strand of literature on endogenous growth has considered pub-
lic capital accumulation by extending the early work of Arrow and Kurz
(1970), but it does not model capital accumulation by multiple levels of
government. For example, Glomm and Ravikumar (1994); Hulten (1994);
Devarajan, Xie, and Zou (1998); among many others, have paid particular
attention to the association between infrastructure and output growth.1
At the same time, the structure of public expenditures and taxes among
diﬀerent levels of government has a fundamental impact on economic growth
in light of the arguments in ﬁscal federalism; see Oates (1972, 1993). In
fact, the proper assignments of expenditures and taxes among multiple lev-
els of government and the proper design of intergovernmental transfers are
prerequisite for eﬃcient and equitable public service provision at both the
national and local levels. One of the most important goals of establishing
a sound intergovernmental ﬁscal relationship is to promote local as well as
national economic growth (see Rivlin, 1992; Bird, 1993; Gramlich, 1993;
and Oates, 1993).
In view of the important link from the design of intergovernmental ﬁscal
relationship to economic growth, it is natural for us to extend the Barro
model and provide an analytical framework for both theoretical and em-
pirical research on the growth eﬀects of public consumption, public capital
formation, taxes, and federal transfers in a federation or in the context of
multiple levels of government. This is the main task of our paper.
Our model extends the Arrow-Kurz-Barro approach in the following as-
pects. (1) We allow public consumption and public capital accumulation at
both the federal and local level, corresponding to expenditure assignments
among diﬀerent levels of government in ﬁscal federalism; (2) on the revenue
side, our model speciﬁes federal taxes and local taxes in light of tax assign-
ment among diﬀerent levels of government in a federation; (3) our model
takes care of federal transfers to locality in the forms of matching grants
for both local public capital formation and local public consumption; (4)
with speciﬁc production function and utility function, we derive analytical
solution to the rate of balanced growth; (5) with simulations, we derive
the responses of the growth rate with respect to federal income tax, federal
1Of course, the empirical analyses in many of these studies have followed the much-
cited work by Aschauer (1989).FISCAL FEDERALISM 473
consumption tax, local income tax, local property tax, local consumption
tax, and federal grants for local public investment and consumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a much extended
Arrow-Kurz-Barro model. Section 3 derives the rate of endogenous growth.
Section 4 studies how the rate of endogenous growth changes with respect
to federal taxes, local taxes, and federal transfers. Section 5 presents the
welfare analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2. THE MODEL
In this paper, there are two levels of government: the federal government
and local governments. Their consumption expenditures are f and s ,
and their capital stocks are kf and ks, respectively. In Arrow and Kurz
(1970) and Barro (1990), among many others, government spending and
public capital accumulation have been introduced into the utility function
in aggregate terms, i.e., total government spending (Barro, 1990), or total
public capital (Arrow, and Kurz, 1970), or total public consumption and
investment (Barro, 1990). Along this line, we introduce public consumption
and capital stocks at both the federal and local levels into the representative
agent’s utility function as
u(c,f,kf,s,ks)
where c is private consumption.
If the utility function u(c,f,kf,s,ks) is twice diﬀerentiable, we further
assume that
uc > 0,uf > 0,us > 0,ucc < 0,uff < 0,uss < 0 (1)
ukf > 0,uks > 0,ukfkf < 0,uksks < 0.
The cross eﬀects ucf, ucs,and ufs are in general assumed to be positive.





where ρ is the constant rate of time preference.
Again, by broadening the frameworks in Arrow and Kurz (1970), and
Barro (1991), we assume that output y is produced by a constant-return-
to-scale production function with three inputs: private capital stock, kp,
federal government capital stock, kf, and local government capital stock,
ks, namely,
y = y(kp,kf,ks). (3)474 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
As in Arrow and Kurz (1970), the marginal productivities of private cap-
ital stock, federal government capital stock, and local government capital
stock are positive and decreasing. Suppose the production function is twice
diﬀerentiable, then,
ykp > 0,ykf > 0,yks > 0,ykpkp < 0,ykfkf < 0,yksks < 0 (4)
In this paper, to derive the analytical solution to the relationship between
the growth rate on the one hand and tax rates and federal transfers on the
other, we choose the utility function to be logarithmic
u(c,f,kf,s,ks) = θ0lnc + θ1lnf + θ2 lnkf+θ3lns+θ4lnks, (5)
where θ0,θ1,θ2,θ3, and θ4 are positive constants satisfy θ0 + θ1 + θ2 + θ3+






where ω1,ω2,and ω3 are positive constants satisfying ω1 + ω2 + ω3 = 1.
2.1. The agent’s optimization problem
The representative agent’s budget constraint is given by the condition
that the after-tax income is to equal to the spending on his consumption,





= (1 − τf − τs)y(kp,ks,kf) − (1 + τcf + τcs)c − τkkp − δkp (7)
where τf and τs are the income tax rates of the federal government and
local government , respectively; τcf and τcs are the consumption tax rates
of the federal government and local government, respectively; and τk is the
property tax rate. To provide some illustrations from the reality, please
note that τs can be regarded as the state income tax in the United States,
τcf can be regarded as sales tax and consumption-based value-added tax
collected by many central governments in Europe, τcs is the standard sales
tax in the United States, and τk is the property tax collected by local
governments in most countries in the world.
Given the taxes, public consumption, and public capital formation at
both the federal and local levels, the agent chooses his consumption path,






u(c,s,ks,f,kf)e−ρtdt (8)FISCAL FEDERALISM 475
subject to budget constraint (7) and the initial capital stock kp(0)
2.2. Federal government’s optimization problem
The federal government collects capital income tax, τf , and consumption
tax, τcf, as its revenue. On the spending side, ﬁrst, it makes two kinds
of transfers to the local government in the forms of matching grants for




+ βs; second, the federal government undertakes its own public
consumption, f, and its own gross investment,
dkf
dt + δkf, namely,
dkf
dt
= τfy + τcfc − α
dks
dt
− βs − f − δkf. (9)
Now, taking local government and private behaviors as given, the federal
government chooses its expenditure path, f(t), and its capital accumulation






subject to its budget constraint (9). The initial federal capital stock, kf(0),
is given. Again, for the federal government, private consumption, c, private
capital stock, kp, local public consumption, s, and local public capital stock,
ks, are all given.
In our speciﬁcation of federal government’s optimization problem, the
rates of federal taxes and federal transfers are exogenously given, whereas
federal consumption and federal capital accumulation are endogenous. The
same approach will be applied to local government’s optimization problem
in the next subsection. We take this approach for the following reasons.
Our focus of our paper is to see how federal taxes, local taxes, and federal
transfers aﬀect capital accumulation and consumption by the private sector,
the federal government, and local governments. Once the optimal responses
of accumulation and consumption with respect to taxes and transfers have
determined, the optimal choices of taxes and transfers can be derived from
welfare maximization or growth maximization. This will be our main tasks
in our simulation analysis in sections 4 and 5. In this sense, our approach
can be viewed as a two-stage optimization.
2.3. Local government’s optimization problem
The local government collects its income tax, τsy, its consumption tax,
τcsc, and its property tax, τkkp at each time period. In additional, the local
government receives federal transfer for its investment and consumption as
the rates of α and β,respectively: α
dks
dt
+βs. Hence, the budget constraint476 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU






+ βs − s + τsy + τkkp + τcsc − δks (11)
Given the choices of the federal government and private agent, the local
government chooses its consumption path, s(t), and its investment path,





subject to budget constraint (11) with the initial capital stock ks(0) given.
3. THE BALANCED GROWTH RATE
To derive the balanced growth rate, we solve the optimization problems
for the private agent, the federal government, and the local government,
respectively.




= {(1 − τf − τs)
∂y(kp,ks,kf)
∂kp
− ρ − τk − δ} (12)










= (1 − τf − τs)
y(kp,ks)
kp










)ω3 − τk − δ − (1 + τcf + τcs)
c
kp
and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞uckp(t)e−ρt = 0. (14)















































































and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
ufkf(t)e−ρt = 0. (17)





































































































and the transversality condition
lim
t→∞
usks(t)e−ρt = 0. (20)
It can be easily shown that, so long as all seven endogenous variables in





























where we denote the common growth rate as φ.
From equations (12) and (21) , we have
φ + ρ + τk + δ












(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ
(1 + τcf + τcs)ω1
. (23)
Substituting equation (22) into equations (18) and (19) and using equa-
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φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
(25)
θ3
θ4(φ + ρ + δ










Substituting equations (22) and (24) into the federal government’s ﬁrst-
order conditions (15) and (16), we get
θ1
θ2





φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
+ τcf
(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ










θ4(φ + ρ + δ
1−α) + φ + δ
1−α
−
β[(φ + ρ + δ
1−α)
θ3
θ4(φ + ρ + δ









φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
+ τcs
(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ
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φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
+τcf
(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ
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(φ + ρ + δ
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θ4(φ + ρ + δ









φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
+ τcs
(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ
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= [φ + ρ + δ − τfω3
φ + ρ + τk + δ
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Now, substituting equations (24) and (26) into equation (18), we get
φ + ρ + τk + δ












θ4(φ + ρ + δ














φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
+
τcf
(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ
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(φ + ρ + δ
1−α)
θ3
θ4(φ + ρ + δ









φ + ρ + τk + δ
ω1(1 − τf − τs)
+ τcs
(1 − ω1)φ + (1 − ω1)(τk + δ) + ρ






φ + ρ + τk + δ








which is a highly nonlinear equation deﬁning the balanced growth rate,
φ, as a function of taxes (τf,τs,τcs,τcf, and τk), federal transfers (α and
β), technology parameters (ω1,ω2,ω3, and δ), and preference parameters
(θ0,θ1,θ2,θ3, θ4, and ρ). We admit that we cannot even obtain a nonlin-
ear equation deﬁning the balanced growth rate when the preferences and
technology are assumed to be CES instead of Cobb-Douglas. But without
public capital accumulation by the federal and local governments, nonlin-
ear or even explicit solutions to the growth rate are possible with more
general preferences and production technology; see Gong and Zou (1997).
4. EFFECTS OF TAXES AND TRANSFERS ON THE
GROWTH RATE
Although the growth rate deﬁned in equation (28) is highly nonlinear
in taxes and federal transfers, it is rather simple to ﬁnd out the eﬀects of
various taxes and federal transfers on economic growth with simulations.
In this section, we report some results on the simulation exercise based on
equation (28).FISCAL FEDERALISM 481
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FIG. 1. Growth rate versus the federal income tax rate. Where the production






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) =
θ0 lnc + θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as:
θ0 = 0.5, θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25,
ρ = 0.08, δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τk = 0.01,τcf = 0, and τcs = 0.05.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the rate of endogenous growth,
φ, and federal government’s income tax rate, τf, on the basis of the fol-
lowing base values for the structure of other taxes and transfers: a federal
consumption tax at zero percent, τcf = 0, a local income tax at ten percent:
τs = .10, a local consumption tax at ﬁve percent, τcs = .05, a capital tax
or local property tax at two percent: τk = .02, a federal matching grant for
local investment at thirty percent: α = .3, and a federal matching grant
for local consumption also at thirty percent, β = .3. The preference and
technology parameters are all the same for all simulations, and they are
given in the legend of each ﬁgure. Figure 1 presents a typical Laﬀer curve
relating the growth rate to federal income tax. Given local taxes, federal
transfers, and all other parameters in our model, a rise in federal income
tax will increases the growth rate before the tax rate hits around thirty
percent. In fact, when the federal income tax is zero, coupled with a zero
rate of federal consumption tax, the growth rate is negative. With the
rise of federal income tax rate from zero to ten percent, the growth rate
rises from a negative seven percent to a positive three percent. After the
federal income tax reaches thirty percent, further increases in the federal
income taxation lower the growth rate. The growth rate is around zero
when federal income tax is seventy percent.
The explanation for this Laﬀer curve is now becoming standard; see
Barro (1990). A change in federal income tax has three eﬀects. First, a
higher federal income tax reduces the return on private capital and the482 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
growth rate directly. But second, a larger tax revenue implies a higher
federal consumption and capital investment that are assumed to increase
both private utility and private productivity, which raises the growth rate.
Third, at the same time, a larger tax revenue can lead to more federal
transfers to the local government whose public consumption and public
investment are also utility- and productivity-enhancing. When the federal
income tax rate is initially very small, the second and the third forces
dominate the ﬁrst force. When the federal income tax is already high, the
ﬁrst force will dominate the second and the third forces.
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FIG. 2. Growth rate versus the local income tax rate. Where the production






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) =
θ0 lnc + θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as:
θ0 = 0.5, θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25,
ρ = 0.08, δ = 0.08,τf = 0.20,α = β = 0.3,τk = 0.01,τcf = 0, and τcs = 0.05.
The similar picture appears in ﬁgure 2, which shows the relationship
between the growth rate, φ, and local income tax rate, τs on the basis
of the following base values for the structure of federal taxes, local taxes
other than local income tax, and federal transfers: a federal income tax
at twenty percent, τf = .20, a federal consumption tax at zero percent,
τcf = 0, a local consumption tax at ﬁve percent, τc = .05, a capital tax or
local property tax at two percent: τk = .02, a federal matching grant for
local investment at 30 percent: α = .3, and a federal matching grant for
local consumption also at thirty percent, β = .3.
Since the base federal income tax is already at a relatively high rate of
twenty percent, the growth rate is rising with local income tax until τs
reaches about eighteen percent. When local income tax rate is set at ﬁfty-
ﬁve percent, the growth rate is zero. Because the local government receives
two matching grants from the federal government at a rate of thirty percentFISCAL FEDERALISM 483
each, and because it also raises tax revenues from the consumption tax and
property tax, the local government can still ﬁnance its productive public
expenditures without resorting to income tax. This is why the growth rate
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FIG. 3. Growth rate versus the property tax rate. Where the production function






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) = θ0 lnc +
θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as: θ0 = 0.5,
θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25, ρ = 0.08,
δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τf = 0.20,τcf = 0, and τcs = 0.05.
Figure 3 reveals the alarming negative eﬀect of local property tax on the
growth rate. The curve is drawn by assuming a federal income tax at twenty
percent, a federal consumption tax at zero percent, a local income tax at
ten percent, a local consumption tax at ﬁve percent, and the two federal
matching grants at thirty percent each. Given the distortions of federal and
local taxes, the growth rate is around six percent when the property tax is
zero; and it reaches zero when the property tax hits twenty-four percent.
Compared to local income tax and local consumption tax, local property
tax is the most distortionary tax in raising local public revenue.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the growth rate, φ, and fed-
eral consumption tax, τcf, by assuming that a federal income tax at twenty
percent: τf = .20, a local income tax at ten percent: τs = .10, a capital
tax or local property tax at two percent: τk = .02, a local consumption
tax at ﬁve percent, τc = .05, a federal matching grant for local investment
at 30 percent: α = .3, and a federal matching grant for local consumption
also at thirty percent, β = .3. We ﬁnd that federal consumption tax has
a positive eﬀect on the growth rate. When the consumption tax increases
from zero to one hundred percent, the growth rate rises from ﬁve percent
to 8.5 percent in ﬁgure 4. This is because a high consumption tax raises
the cost of consumption and forces the consumer to save more (the sub-484 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
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FIG. 4. Growth rate versus the federal consumption tax rate. Where the production






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) =
θ0 lnc + θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as:
θ0 = 0.5, θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25,
ρ = 0.08, δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τf = 0.20,τk = 0.01, and τcs = 0.05.
stitution eﬀect dominating the income eﬀect with our speciﬁcations on the
preferences and technology). The rise in savings results in more capital
accumulation and higher economic growth. Please note that the eﬀect of
a rise in consumption tax on the growth rate is relatively modest in our
simulation given the existing tax distortions of federal and local income
taxes and local property tax.
Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between the growth rate and local
consumption tax τcs. It has essentially the same feature as the relationship
between federal consumption tax and the growth rate in ﬁgure 4, namely, a
rise in local consumption growth rate raises the growth rate. As shown in
ﬁgure 5, a rise of local consumption tax from zero percent to 100 percent
can raise the growth rate from 4.5 percent to around seven percent.
Figure 6 relates the growth rate, φ, to federal matching grants for local
investment and consumption, α and β. A rise in the rate of the matching
grant for local investment always raises the growth rate (the curve φ(α)),
whereas a rise in the rate of the matching grant for local consumption al-
ways reduces the growth rate (the curve φ(β)). Obviously enough, federal
matching grant for local investment stimulates local public capital forma-
tion, which in turn raises private marginal productivity of capital and in-
creases the growth rate. For example, in ﬁgure 6, when the matching grant
for local investment from zero rises to sixty percent, the growth rate in-
creases from around four percent to seven percent. But we also need to noteFISCAL FEDERALISM 485
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FIG. 5. Growth rate versus the local consumption tax rate. Where the production






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) =
θ0 lnc + θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as:
θ0 = 0.5, θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25,
ρ = 0.08, δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τf = 0.20,τk = 0.01, and τcf = 0.
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FIG. 6. Growth rate versus the federal transfers. Where the production function






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) = θ0 lnc +
θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as: θ0 = 0.5,
θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25, ρ = 0.08,
δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,,τf = 0.20,τk = 0.01, and τcs = 0.05.
that a federal matching grant for local consumption has both a income ef-
fect and a price (substitution) eﬀect. While the price eﬀect of federal grant
for local consumption discourages local investment, the income eﬀect does
encourage local investment. From our simulation, the price eﬀect of federal486 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
grant for local consumption always dominates the its income eﬀect.2 In
fact, when the matching rate for local public consumption increases from
zero to sixty-ﬁve percent, the growth rate is down from 5.8% to around
two percent.
5. WELFARE ANALYSIS
With φ implicitly deﬁned in (28), we can now determine the time paths
of various capital stocks, kp(t), kf(t), and ks(t)), private consumption, c(t),
federal consumption, f(t), and local consumption s(t):
kp(t) = kp(0)eφt, kf(t) = kf(0)eφt, ks(t) = ks(0)eφt,
c(t) = c(0)eφt, f(t) = f(0)eφt, s(t) = s(0)eφt, (29)
where the initial capital stocks kp(0),kf(0), and ks(0) are given. c(0) is
determined by equation (23), s(0) is determined from equation (25), and
f(0) is determined from equation (27).



















(θ0lnc(0) + θ1lnf(0) + θ2 lnkf(0)+θ3lns(0)+θ4lnks(0)) +
5φ
ρ2 (30)
Unlike Barro (1990), it is not a simple exercise here to show that wel-
fare maximization and growth maximization are consistent from equation
(30) because the complicated relationship between the growth rate and
the initial values of private consumption, federal consumption, and local
consumption. But for reasonable values of initial capital stocks in our
simulations, welfare is indeed an increasing function of the growth rate.
That is to say, in equation (30), the term
5φ
ρ2 far dominates the term
1
ρ(θ0lnc(0) + θ1lnf(0) + θ2 lnkf(0)+θ3lns(0)+θ4lnks(0)). This is not sur-
prising because ρ2 is rather small, and
5φ
ρ2 can be rather big, whereas the
sum of (θ0lnc(0) + θ1lnf(0) + θ2 lnkf(0)+θ3lns(0)+θ4lnks(0)) is not very
signiﬁcant with the logarithmic utility function and the coeﬃcient con-
strain, i.e., θ0+θ1+θ2+θ3+θ4 = 1. Therefore, in our simulations, we ﬁnd
2See Zou (1994, 1996) for related discussions on the ambiguities of matching grants
on local public consumption and public investment in dynamic models.FISCAL FEDERALISM 487
that welfare eﬀects of federal taxes, local taxes, and federal transfers are
qualitatively the same as the growth eﬀects. For example, ﬁgure 7 presents
the Laﬀer curve of welfare versus federal income taxation, which is similar
to the Laﬀer curve of growth rate versus federal income taxation in ﬁgure
1. Figure 8 relates welfare to local property tax, and it has the same shape
as ﬁgure 3. Finally ﬁgure 9 suggests that consumption tax always raises
welfare. It may sound surprising. But the reason is obvious after a second
thought. A higher consumption tax raises the growth rate, and income
will rise faster. With fast-rising income, the agent’s actual consumption
after paying a high consumption tax is also rising, which leads to a higher
welfare.
Welfare 
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FIG. 7. Welfare versus the federal income tax rate. Where the production function






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) = θ0 lnc +
θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as: θ0 = 0.5,
θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25, ρ = 0.08,
δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τk = 0.01,τcf = 0, and τcs = 0.05.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has extended the Barro (1990) model with one aggregate
government spending and one ﬂat income tax to include federal and local
public consumption, federal and local public capital formation, federal and
local taxes, and federal transfers to locality. It has derived the rate of en-
dogenous growth and examined how the growth rate and welfare respond
to changes in federal taxes, local taxes, and federal transfers. With simula-
tions, the paper has examined how the rate of endogenous growth changes
with respect to federal income tax, federal consumption tax, local income
tax, local consumption tax, local property tax, and federal transfers. Even
though, analytically, the growth-maximizing choices of taxes and transfers488 LIUTANG GONG AND HENG-FU ZOU
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FIG. 8. Welfare versus the property tax rate. Where the production function and






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) = θ0 lnc +
θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as: θ0 = 0.5,
θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25, ρ = 0.08,
δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τf = 0.20,τcf = 0, and τcs = 0.05.
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FIG. 9. welfare versus the local consumption tax rate. Where the production






s and u(c,f,s,kf,ks) =
θ0 lnc + θ1 lnf + θ2 lnkf + θ3 lns + θ4 lnks, respectively. Parameters are selected as:
θ0 = 0.5, θ1 = 0.1, θ2 = 0.1, θ3 = 0.1, θ4 = 0.1, ω1 = 0.5, ω2 = 0.25, ω3 = 0.25,
ρ = 0.08, δ = 0.08,τs = 0.10,α = β = 0.3,τf = 0.20,τk = 0.01, and τcf = 0.
are not the same as the welfare-maximizing choices, simulations show that
these two kinds choices are consistent.
The model in this paper sets up a positive framework for evaluating
how the assignments of taxes and expenditures among diﬀerent levels of
government and intergovernmental transfers aﬀect economic growth. For
example, in our very preliminary simulation analysis it has been shownFISCAL FEDERALISM 489
that local property tax has the largest negative impact on the rate of
economic growth, whereas both federal and local consumption taxes are
always growth-enhancing. This positive eﬀect of consumption taxes shall
be compared to Rebelo (1991). Without public spending , public capital
formation, and taxation by multiple levels of government, Rebelo (1991)
has found that a consumption tax has no eﬀect on the growth rate. It
is also interesting to note that higher consumption taxes at both the fed-
eral and local levels are welfare-improving through their positive eﬀects on
economic growth. Our analysis also sheds light on the role of intergovern-
mental transfers in economic growth. The matching grant for local public
investment always promotes economic growth, whereas the matching grant
for local public consumption is growth-retarding.
For future work, theoretically, we can formulate a game-theoretical growth
model allowing strategic interactions between the federal government and
multiple local governments in taxes, public expenditures, and intergov-
ernmental transfers. Empirically, we can examine the eﬀects of federal
taxes, local taxes, federal transfers on private capital accumulation, federal
consumption and investment, and local consumption and investment. Fur-
thermore, the model is also useful for normative discussion on the welfare-
maximizing and growth maximizing choices of taxes, transfer, and expen-
ditures in the context of ﬁscal federalism.
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